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CURRENT DECISIONS
Antitrust Law-PRicE FixING. Blue Cross v. Commonwealth, 211
Va. 180, 176 S.E.2d 439 (1970).
Blue Cross, a Virginia non-stock corporation, inaugurated a prepaid
drug plan covering out-of-hospital prescriptions. Each cooperating
pharmacist contracted with Blue Cross to furnish prescription drugs to
subscribers at a price equal to the pharmacist's cost plus a professional
fee of $1.85 per prescription." By statute in Virginia, Blue Cross is au-
thorized to conduct a plan furnishing prepaid hospital and similar or
related services as an agent for participating hospitals.2 Under the plan
in issue, payments for drugs furnished by the cooperating pharmacist
were made directly to the pharmacist. In the case of a non-cooperating
pharmacist, payments were made at Blue Cross' option either to the
pharmacist or the subscriber.3 The participating hospitals were bound
to supply the drugs to the subscriber whether or not the funds in the
hands of its agent, Blue Cross, were adequate to defray the cost.4 This
plan was unlike an insurance policy which typically provides for pay-
ments to be made directly to the insured as reimbursement for his ex-
penses.5
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the prepaid drug
plan was a combination of competing pharmacists formed for the pur-
pose and with the effect of stabilizing the price of drugs. It therefore
constituted a price fixing agreement which is illegal per se under the
Sherman Act as well as under the Virginia Code.6
The Sherman Act condemns every contract, combination, or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade or commerce.7 However, two decades after
the enactment of the Sherman Act, in the landmark decision of Stand-
1. Blue Cross v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 180, 182, 176 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1970).
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 32-195.1 (Repl. Vol. 1969):
Hospital Plans.-A hospital or a group of hospitals may conduct directly
or through an agent, who may be either an individual or a non-stock cor-
poration, a plan or plans for furnishing prepaid hospital and similar or re-
lated services.
3. 211 Va. at 182, 176 S.E.2d at 440.
4. Id. at 185, 176 S.E.2d at 442.
5. Id. at 182, 176 S.E.2d at 440.
6. Id. at 192, 176 S.E.2d at 446-47.
7. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal . . . ." Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
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ard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that the Act proscribed only unreasonable restraints of competition."
This construction of the Sherman Act has become known as the "rule
of reason," and requires that a court consider the anticompetitive effect
of an.alleged antitrust offense in light of all the factors and circumstances
in any given situation. By applying the rule of reason in numerous
cases to various anticompetitive business practices, the courts have de-
termined that certain devices are conclusively presumed to be un-
reasonable.
... IT] here are certain agreements or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use.9
One business practice which has been established as a per se violation
is price fixing.10 In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., the Su-
preme Court stated, "Under the Sherman Act a combination formed
for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging,
or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce
is illegal per se." 11 The fixing of maximum as well as minimum price
levels has been held to be illegal per se. 2 Once a per se violation is
established, desirable business consequences or good faith on the part of
the defendant do not constitute a defense?3 The language of section
one of the Sherman Act requires an agreement, i.e., a contract, combi-
8. 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
9. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
10. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). See Bork, The
Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALEa
L. J. 775 (1965), continued in 75 YALE L. J. 373 (1966); Morris, Is Price Fixing Per Se
Reasonable? A Discussion, 47 Ky. L. J. 63 (1958); Rahl, Price Competition and the
Price Fixing Rule-Preface and Perspective, 57 Nw. U. L. REv. 137 (1962). See also
Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine-An Emerging Philosophy of Antitrust Law, 11
U.CLA. L. REv. 569 (1964); Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50
VA. L. REv. 1165 (1964). Other per se violations include division of markets, United
States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 F.271 (6th Cit. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899);
group boycotts, Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941);
and tying arrangements, International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
11. 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
12. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
13. See United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 310 (1956); United
States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276 (1942).
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nation, or conspiracy, 4 but the agreement need not be express. Rather,
the statutory language is satisfied even though an agreement be of a
tacit nature.'5
The decision in Blue Cross represents the first time that an appellate
court has had an opportunity to squarely evaluate a prepaid drug plan
under the antitrust laws.16 The court did not hesitate to find a per se
violation and avoid the necessity of a "rule of reason" analysis. Perhaps
a more prudent approach was indicated. In White Motor Co. v. United
States,'7 the Supreme Court indicated that a per se label should be ap-
plied cautiously to an entirely new factual setting where the possible
economic ramifications of a novel business practice are unknown. It is
arguable that there is a significant difference between the purchase and
sale of industrial commodities or services and a prepaid drug plan.
Therefore, to automatically apply the same per se standard to both
situations is unwarranted until more is known about the anticompetitive
nature of such a plan.' The holding in Blue Cross casts a shadow on
similar prepaid drug plans which exist in other states.' However, other
14. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
15. It is elementary that an unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed
without simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators.
Acceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation
to participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out,
is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful con-
spiracy under the Sherman Act.
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939) (citations omitted).
But see Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537,
541 (1954) wherein, after referring to Interstate Circuit, the Supreme Court stated:
But this Court has never held that proof of parallel business behavior con-
clusively establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such behavior
itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense. Circumstantial evidence of con-
sciously parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the traditional
judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but "conscious parallelism" has not yet
read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.
16. In B & L Pharmacy, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 44 Ill.2d -, 262
N.E.2d 462 (1970), the Supreme Court of Illinois found a similar prepaid drug plan to
be not violative of the Illinois Antitrust Act because it was exempt as an insurance plan
under the state statute. The plan was not considered under the federal antitrust laws.
17. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
18. ArNvrausr & TRADE REG. REP., No. 490, at A-13 to -14 (Dec. 1, 1970).
19. The national Blue Cross Association is a trade association of Blue Cross organiza-
tions similar to Blue Cross of Virginia. The association has recommended the cost plus
a professional fee prepaid drug plan in at least fifteen other states. 211 Va. at 183 n. 5,
176 S.E.2d at 441 n. 5. The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department has advised
by way of a business review letter, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. .§ 50.6 (1970), that on the basis
of information submitted on similar plans in Kansas and California, the Division did not
propose to initiate proceedings under the federal antitrust laws. 211 Va. at 191, 176
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courts may not be as quick to label the plans as illegal per se without
first attempting the significant economic analysis that is required by
the "rule of reason" approach.
NICHOLAS JOHN DERoMA
Constitutional Law-THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND PROPERTY
TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS. Walz v. Tax Con-
mission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
In Walz v. Tax Commission' the appellate taxpayer sought to have
provisions of New York State's Constitution' and Code3 allowing church
property exemption from real and personal property taxes declared in
violation of the establishment clause4 of the United States Constitution.
The taxpayer argued that exemption of church property indirectly re-
quired him to "make a contribution to religious bodies.... ." ' The state
courts upheld the tax exemptions," and their rulings were affirmed upon
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion declared that a literal inter-
pretation and strict application of the establishment clause was impos-
sible because it conflicts with the free exercise clause.- Strict and com-
plete application of both would "defeat the basic purpose of... [the]
provisions, which... [was] to insure that no religion be sponsored or
favored, none commanded, and none inhibited." 8 The Court deter-
mined that the establishment clause did not require complete neutrality
on the part of the government; for the authors of the establishment
clause sought only to prevent "sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." 9 Finally, while
admitting that tax exemption benefited churches, the Court found the
S.E.2d at 446. Although the Justice Department is not bound by the views stated in
the letter, the court in Blue Cross refused to give the letter any weight. Id.; AarnmuvsT
& TRADE REG. REP., supra note 18.
1. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
2. N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1.
3. N.Y. REAL PROPERTY TAx LAW § 420 (McKinney Supp. 1970-71).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .... "
5. 397 U.S. at 667.
6. Walz v. Tax Commission, 30 App. Div. 2d 778, 292 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1st Dept, Sup.
Ct. 1968), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 30, 246 N.E.2d 517, 298 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1969).
7. 397 U.S. at 668-69. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law ... pro-
hibiting the free exercise [of religion] ... "
8. 397 U.S. at 669.
9. Id. at 668.
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